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ABSTRACT
The importance of civil society in policy-making is twofold; civil society
organizations (CSOs) monitor government performance and mediate between
citizens and the state to ensure proper implementation. In this study, we
analyse the effects of two aspects of civil society (civic participation and CSO
consultation) on member states’ implementation of European Union (EU)
policy. The analysis is based on a novel dataset of practical implementation in
24 member states. Our findings reveal that the combination of high levels of
civic participation and routine CSO consultations improves policy
implementation. Furthermore, the effect is conditional on states’ bureaucratic
capacity to accommodate societal interests regarding the EU directives. The
results indicate a paradox; civil society is not effective in countries with low
bureaucratic capacity, where civil society is needed most to improve
government performance.
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Introduction
Civil society organizations (CSOs) are often credited for increasing public
accountability and improving governance outputs. A vibrant civil society
can increase transparency of policy-making and hold governments accounta-
ble to implement policies accordingly. Furthermore, CSOs cooperate with
policy-makers by communicating societal interest and creating a broad
policy support base. However, the strength of civil society varies widely
across countries. Many studies have reported low levels of societal engage-
ment in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
(Howard 2003). Conversely, other scholars have argued that low levels of
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civic participation are compensated by activism aimed at connecting with pol-
itical actors (Foa and Ekiert 2017; Petrova and Tarrow 2006).
Nevertheless, we lack understanding of the relationship between different
aspects of civil society strength and policy implementation by administrative
actors across countries and policy areas. Policy implementation is especially
relevant for CSOs’ success in translating societal interests into outcomes, as
policies become effective when they are enforced by the relevant public
institutions.
In this study, we analyse the impact of civil society strength on policy
implementation by focusing on citizens’ participation in voluntary organiz-
ations (based on the ‘logic of membership’) and CSOs’ opportunities to influ-
ence policy-making through consultations (based on the ‘logic of influence’)
(Schmitter and Streeck 1999). Furthermore, we expect that the effect of civil
society is conditional on the bureaucratic capacities of public institutions
and societal support for public policy. Thus, we contribute to the literature
on civil society by theoretically and empirically distinguishing between two
different aspects of civil society strength and the conditions under which
they affect policy outcomes.
Moreover, the empirical analysis focuses on the implementation of Euro-
pean Union (EU) policies by national administrative actors. Because each
member state must implement policies in accordance with common EU
requirements, we can compare the impact of civil society strength on
implementation performance across countries and policy areas.
To test our hypotheses, we rely on a novel dataset on legislative and prac-
tical implementation across 24 countries and four policy areas (Internal
Market, Environment, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and Social Policy). Our
findings show that civic participation and CSO consultation are like ‘horse
and carriage’: for a positive impact on policy implementation, one cannot
go without the other. Hence, the implementation of EU policies does
benefit from a vibrant civil society, but only if CSOs are included in the
policy-making process. However, the results also indicate a paradox; the
two aspects of civil society strength do not affect implementation in countries
with low bureaucratic capacities, where civil society is most needed to
improve government performance. Finally, public support for EU policy-
making moderates the relationship between civic participation and the
implementation of EU social policy.
Civil society strength
Since its revival in the last couple of decades, civil society has featured in many
different strands of literature focusing on democracy, norm diffusion and
policy-making. These studies ascribe different roles to civil society that have
consequences for conceptualizing its strength. According to social capital
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scholars, civil society is an intermediary structure that provides opportunities
for citizens to mobilize in collective action (Wollebæk and Selle 2007). Based
on this perspective, civil society strength is conceptualized as CSOs’ ability to
mobilize members to engage in civic action. In a similar vein, Schmitter and
Streeck (1999) contend that CSOs function based on ‘the logic of member-
ship’, when they rely on a large member base to legitimize civic causes and
make their voice heard.
Civil society strength can also be conceptualized based on the ‘logic of
influence’ (Schmitter and Streeck 1999), whereby CSOs cooperate with state
actors to influence policies. CSOs aggregate the interests of citizens and act
as mediators in state–society relations by communicating societal preferences
to policy-makers (Treib et al. 2007). For example, Hadenius and Uggla (1996)
underline that CSOs need to cooperate with governments in order to effec-
tively further democratic reforms in countries undergoing transition to
democracy. The influence of civil society on policy reforms then depends
on the opportunity structures provided by the state (Della Porta 2009; Kriesi
et al. 1992). For example, states can empower CSOs by providing them
public recognition and access to policy-making through consultation mech-
anisms. Alternatively, states may deny CSOs opportunities to voice societal
interests during the policy-making process, making the implementation
phase vulnerable to disruptive protests.
Moreover, civil society strength depends on the resources available to
CSOs (money and expertise) to take advantage of political opportunities.
Studies on interest groups (including CSOs) have shown that organizational
resources facilitate CSO access to political institutions (Mahoney and Baum-
gartner 2008). Finally, there is a large literature on transnational civil society
focusing on the links between domestic CSOs and their international counter-
parts. In this view, transnational networks empower national CSOs by provid-
ing expertise and resources (Andonova and Tuta 2014; Schofer and Longhofer
2011).
In this study, we define CSOs as all domestic organizations in the sphere
between economy and state, composed of self-organizing citizens in
pursuit of a common civic goal (Coppedge et al. 2017).1 Furthermore, we
focus on the role of domestic organized civil society in the implementation
of EU directives. Because EU directives set policy requirements that have to
be followed by all member states, they enable us to compare implementation
performance across countries and issue areas.
Civil society and EU policy implementation
Studies of EU politics have acknowledged the role of civil society in EU gov-
ernance (see Heidbreder 2012 for an overview of the literature) and policy
implementation in particular (e.g. Börzel 2010; Börzel and Buzogány 2010).
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Theoretically, there are two major approaches that explain why governments
fail to implement EU policies: enforcement and management (Tallberg 2002).
Whereas enforcement approaches focus on the preferences of implementing
and non-state actors, management scholars emphasize that implementation
problems often emerge from capacity limitations. The role of civil society in
implementation is rooted in both enforcement and management expla-
nations. According to enforcement ideas, civil society involvement in policy-
making increases societal acceptance of policy outputs, even if societal inter-
ests have not been fully accommodated (Börzel 2010). In addition, civil society
monitors the implementation process and raises complaints against breaches
of EU law. Based on the management logic, however, some studies argue that
government cooperation with CSOs could also inhibit the capacity of govern-
ments to resolve implementation problems by increasing the number of veto
players capable of disrupting implementation (Jensen 2007).
Empirically, most studies on the relation between civil society and
implementation have focused on post-communist countries (Sedelmeier
2008). This research shows that differences between the strength of civil
society in Western and Eastern Europe persist after enlargement (Sissenich
2010). The EU had an unequal impact on civil society by empowering non-
state actors with already existing capacities and willingness to cooperate
with the state (Börzel 2010; Börzel and Buzogány 2010). Other studies,
however, paint a more nuanced picture of CSOs’ role in policy implemen-
tation. Despite trends of weak civic participation, CSOs in the region have
developed both enduring and temporary ties with government and bureau-
cratic institutions (Foa and Ekiert 2017; Petrova and Tarrow 2006). Even in
societies with both weak state capacities and civic participation, CSOs are
able to exert influence on government activities through naming and
shaming (Dimitrova and Buzogány 2014).
The strength of civil society also varies within Western EU member states.
For example, Saurugger (2007) reports that the French government is gener-
ally unwilling to discuss matters or negotiate with civil society groups. Other
countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands are believed to encourage
communications with citizens and organized civil society.
Because most studies focus on a small sample of countries in a single policy
area, we lack systematic research on the impact of civil society strength on
implementation in the EU member states across different issue areas. There-
fore, we analyse two aspects of civil society strength: citizens’ participation in
voluntary organizations and government consultations with CSOs during
policy-making. First, while these aspects do not account for variation in the
expertise and material resources in different CSOs within member states
and policy areas, they enable us to study the relevance of civil society on
policy implementation more generally in a cross-national framework.
Second, these dimensions are also theoretically inspired by two different
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logics of civil society strength: the logic of membership and the logic of influ-
ence (Schmitter and Streeck 1999).
Theorizing the role of civil society in policy implementation
Logics of membership and influence
The defining characteristics of civil society strength are captured by ‘the logic
of membership’ and ‘the logic of influence’ (Schmitter and Streeck 1999). As
discussed earlier, based on the logic of membership, civil society strength
depends on its ability to mobilize a large support base for civic causes.
Larger membership helps CSOs legitimize the relevance of their causes and
extract resources for public campaigns. Instead, according to the logic of influ-
ence, civil society strength depends on access to political institutions and
ability to shape policy outcomes through cooperation with government.
Both logics play a role in the implementation of public policy. Based on the
membership logic, CSOs enjoying large and active membership are better able
to understand societal grievances and communicate these to the relevant politi-
cal institutions. When provided access to the policy process, CSOs can rely on the
support of volunteers, mobilize collective action, and extract resources from their
members to facilitate implementation (Stark et al. 2006). Based on the logic of
influence, policy implementation depends on the coordination mechanisms
between CSOs and political institutions. Establishing routine consultations with
non-state actors allows for stable intermediation between CSOs and the state.
To influence public policy, CSOs share expertise with governments about societal
interests and the most effective implementation strategies. CSO involvement in
the policy process, thus, helps policy-makers understand the impact of their
decisions on the citizens they target and take decisions that reflect the EU
policy requirements (Rose-Ackerman 2005). For example, Putnam et al. (1994)
demonstrated that reforms are most effectively carried when they are a joint
effort by CSOs and the state. In short, we expect that both civic participation
and CSO involvement in consultation positively affect policy implementation.
H1a: Higher levels of civic participation (logic of membership) positively affect
policy implementation.
H1b: Government routine consultations with CSOs (logic of influence) positively
affect policy implementation.
Existing research on interest groups and CSOs also acknowledges that there is
a relationship between the logics. In particular, consultation practices have
pushed CSOs to become more professional and as a result lose their represen-
tativeness (Saurugger 2006). In other words, it is assumed that groups put the
majority of their time and resources into ‘logic of inﬂuence’ activities at the
cost of ‘logic of membership’ (cf. Schmitter and Streeck 1999).
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On the other hand, the literature also suggests organizations try to balance
both logics in order to gain access to policy-makers, while at the same time
being member-responsive (Schmitter and Streeck 1999). Thus, consultation
processes are more likely to be successful when CSOs are able to mobilize
public support. CSOs can use their member base to gain awareness of societal
grievances and provide more complete and informed advice to governments
regarding the impact of public policies on the citizens they target. At the same
time, the impact of civic participation (logic of membership) on policy
implementation also depends on whether CSOs are involved in the policy-
making process (logic of influence). The exclusion of CSOs from the policy
process could lead to policies that lack support, because citizens are not
able to communicate their interests to the state (Börzel 2010; Hadenius and
Uggla 1996). Under these circumstances, civic participation could cause
societal discontent against public policies (Rose-Ackerman 2005; Verba et al.
1995). Consequently, even if some organizations may trade less civic partici-
pation for more influence, studies employing the logics contend that organ-
izations need to combine both logics to be successful in influencing public
policy (Kohler-Koch and Buth 2009; Schmitter and Streeck 1999). Thus, we
expect that higher levels of civic participation combined with routine consul-
tations with CSO is positively associated with practical implementation.
H1c: The combination of higher levels of civic participation (logic of member-
ship) and routine consultation with CSOs (logic of influence) positively affects
policy implementation.
Scope conditions: state capacity and societal preferences
The impact of civil society strength is likely to depend on state bureaucratic
capacities and the preferences of citizens in relation to the adopted policies.
Although CSOs can help improve implementation by communicating
potential problems and societal interests, the implementation of EU policies
is the responsibility of administrative actors in the member states. Therefore,
when administrative capacity is low, civil society strength is expected to have
limited impact on policy implementation (Börzel 2010; Sissenich 2010). Rather,
both state and society benefit from each other’s strength (Hadenius and
Uggla 1996). While the state is dependent on the linkages between society
and policy-makers to increase implementation performance, CSOs gain influ-
ence through their engagement with the state (Sissenich 2010).
As argued by Tilly (2004), institutionalized state–society relations, such as
consultation practices, are instrumental for advanced democracies, but they
also increase societal pressure on governments to be responsive through
effective bureaucracy. According to the seminal study by Almond and
Verba (1963), a political system should have the capacity to cope with
intense societal demands through civic participation. More effective
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bureaucratic institutions are better able to incorporate societal demands and
the external requirements of the EU and thereby reinforce the positive effect
civil society strength on policy implementation. If governments do not have
the capacity to incorporate the interests in the consultation process and
meet the EU requirements, this may even raise public discontent (Verba
et al. 1995) and lead to non-compliance with EU policy. Accordingly, we
expect that the effect of civil society on policy outcomes varies across
countries with different levels of administrative capacity.
H2: The impact of civil society strength (CSO consultation and civic participation)
on policy implementation is stronger in high-capacity countries.
Although most literature focused on the facilitating role of CSOs in improving
EU policy implementation (Dai 2005), some studies have acknowledged the
potential for negative effects as well. In his study on member states’ ability
to implement EU labour market policy, Jensen (2007) argues that societal
actors opposed to EU policy can act as veto players and obstruct the
implementation process. Conceptualized as societal veto players, CSOs are
different from the institutional or party-political veto players, as they do not
gain veto rights from their formal position (Bauer et al. 2004). Instead, their
role as veto players is determined by the ability to mobilize constituents to
block the implementation of unfavourable policies. In particular, CSOs can
mobilize against implementation when policies enjoy limited or no support
by citizens. The less societal support policies enjoy, the stronger the incentives
of CSOs to hamper implementation. Thus, if societal preferences are not in line
with a particular EU policy, CSOs representing public interest are likely to
mobilize against its implementation in the domestic context, deteriorating
member states’ compliance with EU law.
H3: The impact of civil society strength on EU policy implementation is weaker
(and even negative) when societal support for EU policy is low.
Research design
Data and measurement of practical implementation
To test our hypotheses on practical implementation, we rely on a novel
dataset on policy implementation across different member states and EU
policy areas that was collected by Zhelyazkova et al. (2016). The dataset is
based on external evaluation reports about national implementation of EU
policies that were prepared by various consultancies contracted by the EU
Commission. The criteria for data collection have been described by Zhelyaz-
kova et al. (2016) and are not discussed here due to space limitations.
However, the main advantage of the dataset is that it provides separate
measures for legal implementation related to the content of national rules
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and for practical implementation capturing administrative activities across 24
EU member states.2 This is important for the purposes of the study, because
the theoretical arguments relate to practical implementation of EU policies
rather than the legal framework adopted by governments. Furthermore, the
dataset covers EU directives from four policy areas: Internal Market, JHA,
Environment and Social Policy.3 Despite the limited number of policy
sectors, the selection captures distinct civil societal groupings within the
member states (e.g. industry, environment, humanitarian international organ-
izations, minority and women rights groups) which enables deriving more
general conclusions about the effects of civic participation and CSO consul-
tation on policy implementation.
The final dataset contains information about both legal and practical
implementation for 24 directives (three Internal Market, three Environment,
four Social Policy, and 14 JHA directives). Previous studies did not find evi-
dence that the considerably higher number of JHA directives is problematic.
Nevertheless, we control for policy-area differences to account for the unba-
lanced number of directives within sectors.
The evaluation reports provide information about member states’
implementation performance regarding separate provisions in a directive. Rel-
evant provisions refer to articles or sub-articles that address separate EU
requirements within directives that require national implementation. For
example, some provisions require the establishment of particular institutional
arrangements to ensure effective enforcement equality bodies in member
states, while others demand effective information dissemination on visa resi-
dent procedures. Practical implementation with EU directives is measured as
the share of correctly implemented provisions by each member state relative
to all relevant provisions in a directive (as assessed by the country experts).
The dependent variable ranges between 0 (none of the EU requirements in
a directive were implemented by the relevant domestic actors) to 1 (all of
the EU requirements were implemented).
Measuring civil society strength, state capacity and societal support
for EU policies
Civil society is a multi-dimensional concept that requires considering multiple
indicators from different data sources to measure its strength (Heinrich 2005).
At the same time, the need for comparative research entails constraining the
analytical focus to civil society characteristics that could be analysed in a
cross-country and cross-issue framework. Following our theoretical argu-
ments, we focus on two aspects of CSO strength: levels of civic participation
and the extent to which CSOs are engaged in the policy-making process (CSO
consultation). Although various comparative projects consider both the
capacity of citizens to engage in civil society and the infrastructure that
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facilitates CSOs, most datasets either lack variation across years (e.g. Civicus
Civil Society Enabling Environment Index), do not cover all EU member
states (e.g. CNP Global Society Index) or do not allow for a comparison
across indicators (e.g. USAID Civil Society Organizational Index). Instead, we
rely on two separate data sources that provide variation across time, cover
all EU member states and differentiate between policy areas (for civic
participation).
Civic participation is measured by the percentage of respondents in Euro-
barometer surveys that indicated they actively participate or volunteer as a
member in specific voluntary organizations. The survey question was asked
in 2004, 2006 and 20114 and the respondents could select the type of organ-
ization from a number of alternatives. We only considered participation in
organizations that are relevant for the policy areas in our dataset. EU policies
in the area of Environment set minimum standards for the protection of the
environment through targets for emission ceilings and recycling of packaging
and vehicles. Internal Market directives set EU requirements for consumer pro-
tection by improving the quality of services and transparency procedures for
companies. The implementation of JHA policies aims to protect the human
rights of asylum seekers and third-country nationals. Finally, EU requirements
regarding Social Policy set minimum standards on the equal treatment of
women and men and the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of ethni-
city, religion, sexual orientation, age and disability. The list of relevant organ-
izations includes: ‘an organization for protection of the environment’
(Environment), consumer organizations (Internal Market), an international
organization: human rights (JHA). In the case of Social Policy, we measure par-
ticipatory activity in organizations for the defence of the rights of minorities
and interest groups for specific causes (such as sexual orientation or
women’s issues).
Second, to obtain information about CSO consultation we rely on data from
the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al. 2017). The project defines broadly civil
society as the ‘organizational layer of the polity that lies between the state
and private life’ and is ‘composed of voluntary associations of people joined
together in common purpose’ (Coppedge et al. 2017: 400). It excludes
public and private economic firms. Country experts identified whether
major CSOs were routinely consulted by policy-makers on issues relevant to
their members. Based on expert assessments, governments were considered
insulated from CSO input (coded as 0), CSOs were considered as but one set of
voices policy-makers take into account (coded as 1) or relevant CSOs were
recognized as stakeholders and given a voice on important policy areas
(coded as 2).
State capacity is measured based on data from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators Database (2016). We employ the ‘Government Effectiveness’ indi-
cator, which ranges between −2.5 and 2.5 and is the most widely used
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aggregate measure for bureaucratic state capacity. The indicator combines
societal perception and expert assessments about the quality of public and
civil services measured on yearly basis.
We measure citizens’ preferences towards EU policy based on information
from the Eurobarometer survey. Societal preferences towards specific supra-
national policies is captured by the percentage of Eurobarometer respondents
(averaged for all years) who believe that a given policy area should be decided
at the EU level.5 Thus, we measure general societal support for EU policies
rather than the policy-specific preferences of CSOs involved in the implemen-
tation process. Nevertheless, this variable captures the extent to which citi-
zens participating in voluntary organizations (civic participation) are likely to
support or reject specific EU policies.
Control variables
In addition to the main independent variables, we control for several
country and policy characteristics that could affect our findings. For
example, civil society is generally considered to be weaker in the new EU
member states from CEE than the EU-15 member states from Western
Europe (Sedelmeier 2008) (Western state = 1). Furthermore, the willingness
of governments to accommodate CSOs’ input during the implementation
process could depend on the policy-makers’ preferences towards suprana-
tional policies. The expert reports also provide unique information about
the relevant ministers involved in the implementation process for a given
directive. Information about political actors’ positions regarding different
policy sectors was obtained from the Chapel Hill surveys (Bakker et al.
2015). Moreover, state capacity to implement the EU policies also
depends on the number of institutional veto players responsible for
policy implementation (measured as the number of ministries involved in
the implementation process).
The quality of national legislation with regard to supranational policy is also
likely to be a strong predictor for practical implementation. In particular, some
countries may have high standards enshrined in their national legislation.
Consequently, CSOs can contribute little to improve the implementation
process, as national bureaucrats could simply follow established national
rules. The measure for legal compliance follows the same logic as the opera-
tionalization of the dependent variable and captures the share of legally com-
pliant EU provisions relative to all evaluated provisions within a directive.
At the policy level, we acknowledge that the effects of civic participation
and consultation on practical implementation vary across policy areas. We
also control for the degree of leeway (discretion) that EU directives grant
member states during implementation (measured as the share of ‘may’ pro-
visions relative to all directive provisions).
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Finally, differences in the evaluation reports may bias the validity of the
estimates. Thus, we control for the structure (reports structured based on
specific rules or specific countries), length (number of pages allotted to a par-
ticular country) and timing of the reports (number of days between the
implementation deadline and the publication of the first report).
Results
Descriptive analysis
Before testing the effects of civic participation and consultation on the prac-
tical implementation of EU policies, we analyse the distribution of the two
components of civil society strength across countries and policy areas.
First, civic participation based on the Eurobarometer surveys (2004–2011) is
most pronounced in associations related to the protection of women and
minority rights (Social Policy; median level = 2.1) and it is lowest in inter-
national and human rights organizations (JHA; median = 0.8) (Figure 1,
left).6 One possible explanation is that human rights organizations depend
more on donors and supporters signing petitions to further their causes,
rather than voluntary membership by citizens. Second, there is a clear
divide between Western and CEE member states in levels of civic participation
(Figure 1, right). All CEE member states have lower rates of civic participation
than Western member states. This is in line with earlier studies that report a
Figure 1. Distribution of civic participation across policy areas (left) and mean of civic
participation compared to mean of CSO consultation across member states (right).
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lack of societal engagement in voluntary organizations as an indicator for a
weak civil society in this region (Howard 2003; Sissenich 2010). With the
exception of Lithuania, less than 1 per cent of the respondents from the
CEE member states reported participation activities in the selected CSO cat-
egories. On average, civic participation is highest in Sweden (4.7 per cent), fol-
lowed by Italy (4.0 per cent) and Denmark (3.8 per cent).
Member-state patterns of CSO consultation paint a more mixed picture. In
line with findings by Petrova and Tarrow (2006) and Foa and Ekiert (2017), civil
society in CEE member states is not systematically weaker than in their
Western counterparts, once other dimensions of civil society strength are con-
sidered. Moreover, the two civil society dimensions are not correlated.
Whereas CSOs in Sweden can rely on a relatively high number of volunteers,
their engagement in the policy-making process through consultation is
limited. In contrast, the Polish government routinely engages in consultations
with CSOs, but very few citizens participate in the selected voluntary
organizations.
Explanatory analysis
Table 1 presents the results on the effects of civic participation and CSO con-
sultation on the implementation performance of member states regarding 24
EU directives from four different policy areas. Because practical implemen-
tation is bounded between 0 and 1, we employ fractional logit analysis7 to
test our hypotheses. Table 1 reports the effects of civic participation and con-
sultation separately (Model 1) as well as the interaction between the two
aspects of civil society strength (Model 2). Models 3 and 4 present the
results from the analysis of the impact of civil society strength on practical
implementation in low- (Model 3) and high-capacity countries (Model 4).
We also test the moderating effect of societal preferences on the relation
between civil society strength and practical implementation by including
the interaction between societal preferences and civic participation in
Model 5. Arguably, societal preferences influence citizens’ incentives to
mobilize against policy implementation. Therefore, we assume that civic par-
ticipation, as an aspect of civil society strength, is more conducive to changes
in societal preferences than CSO involvement in policy-making.
The results in Table 1 provide notable insights about the relationship
between civic participation, state–society cooperation and member states’
implementation performance. In particular, high rates of participation in
voluntary organizations (logic of membership) and frequent access to national
government (logic of influence) alone have no significant impact on state
implementation performance (Model 1). Whereas frequent CSO consultation
could improve government knowledge about gaps in implementation, the
amount of consultation does not lead to better implementation. One possible
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explanation is that CSOs could act as veto players in the implementation
process (Jensen 2007).
However, high levels of civic participation coupled with frequent CSO invol-
vement in government consultations increase the level of practical implemen-
tation of EU directives (Model 2). Our findings portray a complex relationship
between civic participation and government consultation practices with CSOs.
With regard to the main explanatory variables and their interactive effect, we
cannot interpret these directly (see Brambor et al. 2006). Instead, Figure 2
Table 1. Analysis of civil society strength and practical compliance with EU directives.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Civic participation −0.030
[0.046]
−0.258***
[0.054]
−0.160
[0.123]
−0.445*
[0.221]
−0.039
[0.613]
CSO consultation 0.011
[0.058]
−0.245**
[0.083]
−0.068
[0.161]
−0.450+
[0.271]
0.011
[0.057]
Participation × consultation 0.125***
[0.033]
0.091
[0.063]
0.202**
[0.071]
Societal support −0.642
[0.530]
−0.718
[0.518]
−1.861
[1.155]
−0.794
[0.628]
−0.655
[0.821]
Participation × social support 0.006
[0.403]
Legal compliance 1.335***
[0.354]
1.378***
[0.349]
1.180**
[0.442]
1.368**
[0.429]
1.335***
[0.349]
State capacity 0.222
[0.156]
0.222
[0.157]
0.223
[0.164]
Western state −0.021
[0.171]
−0.006
[0.170]
−0.139
[0.191]
0.248
[0.251]
−0.022
[0.180]
Ministerial support −0.047
[0.058]
−0.080
[0.062]
0.015
[0.100]
−0.101
[0.085]
−0.047
[0.056]
Number of ministers −0.223***
[0.058]
−0.230***
[0.059]
−0.297***
[0.081]
−0.175*
[0.082]
−0.223***
[0.059]
Policy discretion 3.578*
[1.758]
3.495*
[1.708]
3.424*
[1.657]
2.968+
[1.674]
3.579*
[1.799]
Policy sectors
Internal Market −1.587+
[0.896]
−1.570+
[0.893]
−2.409**
[0.868]
−1.206
[1.050]
−1.587+
[0.897]
Justice & Home Affairs −1.390+
[0.712]
−1.420*
[0.706]
−1.494*
[0.701]
−1.390+
[0.709]
−1.389*
[0.695]
Social Policy −1.300***
[0.316]
−1.417***
[0.312]
−2.532***
[0.427]
−1.104***
[0.295]
−1.300***
[0.315]
Report characteristics
Rule-specific −1.769**
[0.670]
−1.768**
[0.660]
−1.399*
[0.577]
−1.960*
[0.767]
−1.770**
[0.676]
Evaluation period −0.0002
[0.0002]
−0.0002
[0.0002]
−0.0004*
[0.0002]
−0.0001
[0.0002]
−0.0002
[0.0002]
Number of pages 0.017
[0.031]
0.020
[0.031]
0.048+
[0.028]
0.008
[0.033]
0.017
[0.032]
Constant 3.638***
[1.069]
4.384***
[1.034]
6.110**
[2.157]
5.248***
[1.241]
3.659*
[1.608]
Observations 409 409 160 249 409
+p < 0.10.
*p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.
***p < 0.001.
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, clustered in Directives.
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presents a three-dimensional illustration of the interactive relationship
between civic participation and CSO consultation. When civic participation
is limited, the predicted effect of CSO involvement in government consul-
tations on practical implementation is negative. Thus, CSO consultation
decreases the quality of practical implementation, in countries and issue
areas with no civic participation. One possible explanation is that lack of
civic participation may decrease CSO awareness about societal concerns
and, hence, their ability to effectively convey potential implementation pro-
blems during the consultation process.
Similarly, we observe a significant negative effect of civic participation on
practical implementation for scenarios where national governments never
consult with the relevant CSOs (CSO consultation = 0). In instances where
CSOs are excluded from government policy-making, higher civic participation
obstructs the implementation process (as illustrated by the increasingly nega-
tive effect of civic participation). The predicted effect of civil society strength
turns positive only when at least 5 per cent of Eurobarometer respondents
indicated voluntary participation in any of the selected policy areas. Conver-
sely, the significant positive interaction effect supports our theoretical argu-
ment that high civic participation coupled with frequent interactions with
government improves member state’s implementation performance with
regard to EU directives.
Whereas we find general support for H1c, the impact of civil society is likely
to vary across countries with different state capacities (H2) and EU societal
preferences (H3). To test H2, we replicated the analysis for low- and high-
capacity countries separately in Models 3 and 4 respectively. A state is con-
sidered to have high administrative capacities to implement public policy, if
it scores higher than 0.90. While the threshold may appear arbitrary, the
Figure 2. Predicted coefficients of CSO consultation and civic participation.
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choice ensures that both CEE and Western member states are represented in
the two capacity categories.8
As expected, civil society strength does not have a significant effect on
practical implementation in low-capacity states (Model 3). The picture is differ-
ent for high-capacity countries (Model 4), where the impact of engaged citi-
zens and routine CSO consultations strongly resembles the findings in
Model 2 of Table 1. In short, the analysis suggests that differences in civic par-
ticipation and CSO consultation significantly affect the implementation
process in high-capacity countries only.
Finally, the observed negative impact of civic participation may be due to
low societal support towards EU policies (H3). However, societal support does
not significantly affect the relationship between civic participation and prac-
tical implementation (Model 5). Because societal preferences may bemore rel-
evant for some policy areas than others, we further explored the interaction
between societal support and civic participation across different policy
areas (see Figure 3). The analysis shows that the effect of civic participation
on practical implementation is conditional on societal EU support only in
Social Policy and Environment directives. Furthermore, whereas high EU
policy-specific societal support strengthens the effect of civic participation
on the practical implementation of EU Social Policy, high societal support
seems to impede the effectiveness of civic action in Environment. However,
the latter effect disappears if we control for national legislation in relation
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Figure 3. Predicted coefficients of CSO consultation and civic participation.
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to EU environmental policy. One possible explanation concerns the nature of
civic actions regarding Environment policies. Citizens often participate in
environmental associations because they are dissatisfied with the way gov-
ernments handle environmental problems. Environmentally engaged citizens
also realize that problems related to curbing emissions or waste management
require global policy and are consequently generally supportive of suprana-
tional directives.
In line with our expectations, civic participation has a positive effect on
practical implementation when EU citizens are supportive of supranational
policy concerning anti-discrimination and gender equality directives. EU
social policy directives generally incur high adoption costs on governments
(e.g. facilities for accommodating disabled persons at the work place) and
require changes in long-standing employment structures. In such situations,
high level of societal support coupled with strong civic participation exerts
pressure on governments to incur the necessary costs for practical implemen-
tation. Instead, the limited effect of societal preferences on the implemen-
tation of Internal Market directives supports ideas that citizens have few
opportunities to influence policies dominated by business interests. In the
case of JHA policy, societal preferences carry little weight given the observed
low levels of voluntary participation in international human rights organiz-
ations. As discussed earlier, human rights organizations depend on donors
and supporters signing petitions to further their causes. Therefore, citizens’
preferences may be much more relevant for other types of civic action than
participation in voluntary organizations.
Conclusion
In this study, we analysed the link between two aspects of civil society strength
(civic participation and CSO consultation) and EU policy implementation across
different countries and policy areas. CSOs are expected to play an important role
in the implementation process by monitoring implementation or mediating
societal interests and policy-makers’ goals. Whereas the conceptualization of
CSO strength varies in different strands of literature (Foa and Ekiert 2017; Hein-
rich 2005), there are few attempts to systematically analyse the effects of differ-
ent dimensions of CSO strength on policy outcomes. To fill this gap, we
examined the interaction between civic engagement (logic of membership)
and the degree to which governments consult with CSOs during policy-
making (logic of influence). Both the capacity of CSOs to mobilize their
members and their ability to influence policies through government consul-
tation are expected to facilitate policy implementation. The analyses show
that civic participation contributes to policy implementation when state
actors frequently include CSOs in the policy-making process. Conversely, if
CSOs are denied access to the policy-making process, civic participation
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aggravates the implementation process. One possible explanation is that politi-
cally engaged citizens turn against the implementation of EU policies when they
feel they have little influence over the adopted policies. Our findings also show
that frequent consultations with CSOs improve practical implementation, if civic
participation is high. There are different explanations for this finding. High levels
of participation could increase CSO awareness of societal concerns and thus
their ability to communicate potential implementation problems. Furthermore,
governments are likely to be more responsive to the ideas of the relevant CSOs
in countries and issue areas that attract high civic engagement.
This study also shed some light on the conditions under which the two
dimensions of civil society strength affect implementation outcomes across
different countries and policy areas. Thus, we find that civic participation and
CSO consultation do not influence practical implementation in low-capacity
countries. This finding suggests a paradox between the expected role and
the actual impact of civil society on policy outcomes, as strong civil society
does not influence policy implementation in situations where it is needed to
counteract weak bureaucratic institutions (Foley and Edwards 1996).
Our findings also suggest that the impact of civic participation on policy
implementation is conditioned on societal general support for EU policy in
some issue areas. In particular, societal support for EU policy-making effectively
mobilizes civic action in favour of policy implementation in Social Policy direc-
tives, but not in other policy areas. Because these findings could be partially due
to the limited number of observations available for the analysis of separate
policy areas, future research should focus on the interaction between policy
area characteristics and societal actors. Related to that, we were not able to
capture policy-area differences in government consultation practices with
CSOs. Future research should try to distinguish between individual CSOs in
terms of their relations with domestic policy-makers and how such relations
affect policy outcomes. More in-depth qualitative work could also help better
capture the quality of CSO consultations and the extent to which governments
are willing to listen to the views of non-state actors. Moreover, we should
acknowledge that civic participation and CSO consultation are not the only rel-
evant aspects of civil society strength, but individual CSOs are often able to
influence the implementation process through material resources and policy
expertise. Unfortunately, information about individual CSO endowments is
not available for a large number of countries and policy areas. Future research
should try to shed more light on the interaction between various dimensions of
civil society strength and policy outcomes.
Notes
1. This includes voluntary associations, interest groups, trade unions, social move-
ments, NGOs and professional associations.
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2. The dataset does not include information about Croatia. We excluded Luxem-
bourg, Cyprus and Malta due to missing data on several independent variables.
3. Zhelyazkova et al. (2016) provide further information about the selection of
policy areas.
4. Data was taken from Eurobarometer 62.2 (2004), 66.3 (2006) and 76.2 (2011), and
merged with the same or closest years when practical implementation was
recorded.
5. The variable combines information from the following Eurobarometer items and
surveys: environment protection (1996–2010); immigration policy (1996–2010);
competition policy (2005–2010); human rights protection (1999) and men/
women equality (2009).
6. Considering a number of observations fall outside the range of observations in
Environment, Internal Market and JHA, we employed robustness checks, which
showed that the potential mild and extreme outliers did not significantly change
the results.
7. We also employed a multilevel mixed-effect model to account for the nested
structure of the data. Since only the directive-level random effects had a signifi-
cant effect, we only cluster in directives. The supplementary appendix presents
the models with standard errors clustered in member states.
8. Setting higher thresholds for government effectiveness resulted in models
where state capacity was collinear with post-communist legacies. We should
note that we replicated the analysis, using different thresholds for low and
high capacity. The results remain essentially the same and are reported in the
supplementary appendix.
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